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Abstract: This article examines religious symbols from the perspective
of what is meant by state neutrality in religious matters and argues that
neutrality cannot be a uniform constitutional principle, enforced at the
European level, containing a particular notion of how the relations
between state and religion should be structured. It argues that the
judgement of the Grand Chamber in Lautsi II was correct but that the
Court could have developed the idea that coercion should be the test for
a violation of freedom of religion or belief, and not the subjective
feeling of offence experienced by some persons in the presence of some
religious symbols. The article, in addition to looking at the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR,  also looks at that of continental national
courts with a particular emphasis on the approach adopted in Spain
and Germany. 
Introduction: Why religious symbols in the public space are a
subject worth of study
In the last years, scholars have paid considerable attention to the issues
raised by the use of religious symbols in the public space. This
unprecedented display of literature on religious symbols in the last
years – not only legal literature – suggests this continues to be a subject
worth of study. Indeed, I am persuaded that religious symbols are a very
significant topic for study, that we are not overestimating its interest.
My persuasion is based on two main reasons.
The first one is obvious: religious symbols in the public space are a
significant subject for study because they are important for many
people around the world. In Europe, the case law of the European Court
of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) is expressive of how significant
Christian and Islamic symbols are for people in a number of countries.1
1 See, for instance, among others: Dahlab v. Switzerland, Decision on the
admissibility of Appl. Nr. 42393/98, 15 February 2001; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey,
29 June 2004 (Chamber’s decision), and Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 10 November
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The geographical and human landscape of Islamic countries is
inconceivable without their religious symbols, and the same occurs in
countries with a strong and ancient Christian tradition. Christian
symbols and names permeate the entire social life in most Western
countries. Public institutions often have a patron saint, their buildings
display Christian signs and even public corporations have a symbolic
participation in religious ceremonies.2 Recently, the use of full-face veil
by Muslim women (burka, niqab) has caused a heated public debate in
Europe, which is still ongoing and has led to legislation in France and
Belgium, as well as to legislative initiatives in The Netherlands and
Spain.3 Of course, the United Kingdom has not been an exception and
the courts have been asked to adjudicate on conflicts deriving from
individuals’ moral obligation to wear objects of religious significance
in public places.4 These few examples tell us that religious symbols
2005 (Grand Chamber’s decision); Dogru v. France, and Kervanci v. France,
both of 4 December 2008; Ahmet Arslan et al. v. Turkey, 23 February 2010;
Lautsi v. Italy, 3 November 2009 (Chamber’s decision), and Lautsi v. Italy, 18
March 2011 (Grand Chamber’s decision); Eweida and others v. United
Kingdom, 15 January 2013. 
2 See, for instance, in Spain, the facts that were at the origin of the decisions
mentioned are set out later in this paper.  
3 See, for further legal and bibliographical references: B. Aláez, Some
constitutional thoughts about the Islamic full veil ban in Europe, in 7-3 Vienna
Journal of International Constitutional Law (2013) (forthcoming); M.T. Areces,
La prohibición del velo integral islámico. A propósito de la sentencia del
Tribunal Supremo and A. López-Sidro, Restricciones al velo integral en
Europa y en España: la pugna legislativa por prohibir un símbolo, both of them
in 32 Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado
(2013) (www.iustel.com); V. Camarero, El velo integral y su respuesta en
democracias europeas, Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia, 2012; R. Navarro-Valls &
J. Martínez-Torrón, Conflictos entre conciencia y ley: las objeciones de
conciencia (2d ed.), Iustel, Madrid, 2011, pp. 378-384; A. Overbeeke, Towards
a General Burqa Ban in The Netherlands?, in ‘The Burqa Affair across Europe:
between Private and Public’, Ashgate, Aldershot 2013, pp. 101-126; G. van der
Schyff & A. Overbeeke, Exercising Religious Freedom in the Public Space: A
Comparative and European Convention Analysis of General Burqa Bans, in 7
European Constitutional Law Review (2011), pp. 424-452
4 See, for instance, among legal literature published in Spain about UK cases: J.
G. Oliva, La cuestión de la simbología religiosa en el Reino Unido, in 15
Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesi· stico del Estado
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matter to people and, therefore, neither the law nor legal scholarship
can be indifferent to them.
There is also a second reason, which is the one that more directly
inspired this paper. Religious symbols in the public space are a
significant topic for study because they are closely connected with the
notion of state neutrality towards religion, which tends to be conceived
in the West, more and more, as a necessary condition for the adequate
protection of freedom of religion and belief. 
When we engage in the legal study of religious symbols in the public
sphere from the perspective of state neutrality there are – among others
– three distinctions that should be taken into account.
First, we must distinguish between personal and institutional symbols.
Certainly, when designing the public space there is a distinction
between permitting the personal use of religious symbols (clothing,
objects of veneration, etc.) and permitting - or imposing - the display of
religious symbols in public areas, buildings or institutions.5 However,
as I will explain in this paper, the practical solutions adopted for both
types of symbols are often interrelated and depend on an underlying
notion of state neutrality.
Second, if we refer particularly to Europe, as is the intention of this
paper, we must differentiate between the appropriate solutions that
could – or should – be found at a pan-European level (i.e., at the level
of the Council of Europe) and at the national level of each European
country. This distinction is of the utmost importance, for the common
concept of state neutrality applicable to all European countries is not
equivalent to the parallel notion of state neutrality that each of those
(2007), pp. 1-14; M. Hill, Simbología religiosa y objeción de conciencia en el
lugar de trabajo, in 32 Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho
Eclesiástico del Estado (2013), pp. 1-15 (which is an extended version, in
Spanish of the paper, by the same author, Religion at work, in 163 New Law
Journal, pp. 89-90).
5 Of course, further distinctions would be necessary. For instance, to distinguish
between different types of public spaces (the impact and significance of a
religious symbol is different in a public square, a hospital, a school, a
courtroom or a parliament); or to take into account if only one religious symbol
or a variety of symbols are displayed.
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countries have adopted in their respective constitutions (and
constitutional jurisprudence).
Third, we must distinguish between public policies and the law applied
by the courts. This differentiation is also of great consequence, because
in the democratic process the courts are not per se the place to design
the (allegedly) most adequate public policies – this is the competence
of legislatures and governments. The role of the courts is circumscribed
to apply the law of the land. This means, in the area of religious
symbols, to adjudicate on fundamental rights, i.e., to decide if certain
policies or practices concerning religious symbols impinge upon the
freedom of religion and belief or other fundamental rights of citizens.
Such a limited role implies a self-restraint on the part of the courts. In
a particular case, the judges may be well convinced that a certain policy
or practice concerning religious symbols is not the most appropriate
one, and nonetheless their function consists strictly in determining if
such policy or practice is acceptable within the legal framework for
which they are responsible. In Europe, this legal framework is defined
by the relevant constitutions, for national courts; and by the European
Convention of Human Rights, for the ECtHR. The courts are not asked
to say whether they agree or not with the choices taken by the legislator
or the government. They are asked to say if the legislator or the
government have acted against constitutional rights or against the
fundamental freedoms recognized by the European Convention on
Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR).
Taking into account the foregoing distinctions, this paper will adopt a
strictly legal perspective, from which I will examine the issue of
institutional religious symbols at a pan-European level. In other words,
I will focus on which should be the role and position of the ECtHR with
regard to public policies on the display of institutional religious
symbols. In addition, I will make some brief comparative remarks with
Spanish and German jurisprudence. 
Which State Neutrality? 
As indicated above, there is an increasing tendency to point out
religious neutrality as one of the necessary characteristics of
contemporary democratic states. Defining the notion of state neutrality,
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therefore, becomes a crucial issue if we agree with such tendency.
From a pan-European perspective, the first approach is a negative one
– i.e. to define what state neutrality is not. 
In this respect, it is clear that neutrality cannot be a uniform
constitutional principle, enforced at the European level, containing a
particular notion of how the relations between state and religion should
be structured. The ECtHR has since long held that the European
Convention is aimed at guaranteeing certain fundamental freedoms –
among them religious freedom – but does not impose any particular
model of relations between state and religion.6 The underlying
assumption is that the state’s attitude towards religion is primarily a
matter of political choice, and is the result, to a large extent, of the
historical tradition and the social, moral and cultural circumstances of
each country. The legal framework of the European Union – in
particular, Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union – is even more specific about the fact that there is no uniform
European rule on the status of churches and religious communities, and
that this is a matter that has to be decided at the national level.7
For those reasons, neutrality cannot be understood as synonymous with
strict separation between state and religion. This is a strong differential
factor between the analysis of issues raised by institutional religious
symbols in Europe and in the United States, respectively. In the US, the
courts’ construction of the constitutional establishment clause plays a
crucial role and prevents any use of religious symbols that can lead to
6 See, for further details and references, J. Martínez-Torrón & R. Navarro-Valls,
The Protection of Religious Freedom in the System of the Council of Europe, in
‘Facilitating Freedom of Religion and Belief: A Deskbook’ (ed. by T.
Lindholm, C. Durham & B. Tahzib-Lie), Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2004, pp.
216-218.
7 This is the text of Article 17 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union: ‘1. The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national
law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member
States. – 2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of
philosophical and non-confessional organisations. – 3. Recognising their
identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open,
transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations.’
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an interpretation that the state is endorsing religion in general or – even
less – a particular religion.8
The foregoing does not mean that strict separation between state and
religion cannot be adopted in Europe, or that it is precluded by the
ECHR. On the contrary, separation is one of the legitimate choices that
European states have at their disposal. But note this: the discussion
about adopting or not a system of separation, as the best way to
guarantee state religious neutrality, must take place at the national level
– i.e., at the level of each country’s constitutional principles that define
the framework of relations between state and religion. France and
Turkey, for instance, claim to have a system of separation and proclaim
a strict laïcité of the state. However, they are not the rule but an
exception (and a detailed analysis of their respective legal systems may
cast serious doubts about how real separation between state and
religion is in those countries). Interestingly, most European states have
adopted, explicitly or implicitly, formulas of state cooperation with
religion in their constitutions and/or in their laws.9
8 For a detailed and analytical explanation of the US constitutional prohibition of
establishment of religion and its judicial interpretation, see, for instance, M.W.
McConnell, J.H. Harvey & T.C. Berg, Religion and the Constitution (3rd ed.),
Aspenlaw (Wolters Kluwer), USA, 2011, pp. 121 et seq.; from a comparative
perspective, see W.C. Durham & B.G. Scharffs, Law and Religion, Aspenlaw
(Wolters Kluwer), USA, 2010, pp. 113 et seq. For a critical analysis of the
judicial approach to the non-endorsement requirement derived from the
establishment clause, see, among others, from different perspectives: D.
Laycock, ‘Nonpreferential aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent’, in 27 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. (1985-1986), pp. 875-923; M.W.
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, in 27 Wm. and
Mary L. Rev. (1985-1986), pp. 933-941; A.R. Loewy, Rethinking Government
Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped
Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight, in 64 N.C. L. Rev. (1985-1986), pp.
1049-1070; J.H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, in
18 J.L. & Pol. (2002), pp. 499-536; T.C. Berg, What’s Right and Wrong with
‘No Endorsement’, in 21 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y (2006), pp. 307-322.
9 For a succinct explanation of the relations between state and religion in the EU
countries, see State and Church in Europe (ed. by G. Robbers) (2nd. ed.),
Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005. More detailed studies analysing concrete aspects
of law and religion in EU states can be found, for example, in the publications
mentioned in the Internet pages of the European Consortium for Church and
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Contrary to what occurs in the US, from a pan-European perspective
(i.e., from the perspective of the ECHR) neither cooperation with
religion nor endorsement of religion is a problem per se. Not even the
remaining systems of established churches are as such incompatible
with the ECHR. One may think that those systems are the product of
particular historical circumstances, and are not perhaps the best choice
in contemporary times, but they are compatible with the ECHR. From
a pan-European perspective, the crucial question with regard to the
systems of cooperation, endorsement or establishment – as well as to
systems of separation – is to guarantee that they respect religious
freedom and the equality principle. What the ECHR does not allow is
that constitutional choices degenerate, in practice, into a repressive or
discriminatory legal framework, in which, for instance, persons not
belonging to the privileged religion or religions actually suffer
discrimination in the exercise of their freedom of religion and belief. 
This, precisely, helps us define in positive terms the European notion of
state religious neutrality. Taking into account that the ECHR is not
aimed at imposing a uniform model of church-state relations but at
guaranteeing fundamental rights, neutrality has to be conceived as a
distinctive feature of European states that constitutes a necessary
requirement to adequately protect freedom of thought, conscience and
religion (art. 9 ECHR) and non-discrimination on religious grounds
(art. 14 ECHR). The protection of freedom of religion and belief of all
individuals and groups, and not the model of church-state relations, is
the point of reference to understand the common meaning of state
neutrality in Europe. 
In this respect, the case law of the ECtHR permits us to infer the two
main coordinates that define the notion of state neutrality. 
State Research: http://www.churchstate.eu/Publications (accessed 26 October
2013). Interesting data and analysis can also be found in Religion and the
Secular State: Interim Reports (ed. by J. Martínez-Torrón & W.C. Durham),
prepared for the XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law – text
available in: http://www.iclrs.org/index.php?blurb_id=975 (accessed 26
October 2013). More detailed studies and law and religion on different 
world countries (not only in Europe) are gradually appearing in the
International Encyclopaedia of Laws published by Wolters-Kluwer; see
http://www.ielaws.com/religion.htm (accessed 26 October 2013).
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One is impartiality vis-à-vis religions or beliefs. This applies especially
to religious differences or disputes. A number of judgments of the
ECtHR relating to internal religious disputes (with regard, in particular,
to the appointment of religious leaders or to religious splits) signal that
the state cannot take sides in those matters and must act as an impartial
arbiter or organizer. When facing the social tension that is occasionally
created by competing religious groups, the role of national authorities
is not to determine which party is right or wrong, or to eliminate
pluralism as the price to guarantee social peace. The state’s function is
rather to organize religious pluralism in a way that ensures that all
individuals are free to practice their religion, that diverging groups
respect each other, and that all groups are as autonomous as possible to
take care of their own internal affairs without undue external
interferences. Thus, the Court has affirmed that the States exceed their
power when they fail to remain neutral with regard to changes in the
leadership of a religious community, when they try to force the
community to come together under a unified leadership against its own
wishes, or when they attempt to prevent a schism in a church for
dissensions of religious nature.10
However, formal impartiality is not sufficient. Deeply understood, state
impartiality must be based on a second coordinate: the incompetence of
the state to judge the truth or falsity of religious doctrines, and more
generally to have any judgment on strictly religious issues. In this
respect, it is important to conceive stricto sensu the state’s
incompetence on religious matters. It is not that the state decides to
renounce one of its legitimate competences for the sake of achieving a
higher level of religious freedom. It is more than that. State neutrality
implies that strictly religious issues are not part of its legitimate
competences, and therefore any interference in such issues would be,
10 See, especially, Serif v. Greece, 14 December 1999; Hasan and Chaush v.
Bulgaria, 26 October 2000; Agga v. Greece, 17 October 2002; Supreme Holy
Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, 16 December 2004 (which refer
to public authorities’ intervention in leadership disputes within Muslim
communities); and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 13
December 2001; Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, 14 September 2007
(which refer to public authorities’ refusal to register Orthodox religious
communities formed out of a split from other Orthodox church).
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ipso facto and ipso iure, an unjustified limitation on the religious
freedom of individuals and groups. The state cannot say which religion
is better or worse, or which religious leader is more or less appropriate
for a religious group, because it lacks all legitimate competence on
those issues.11
Nevertheless, it is also important to note that this notion of neutrality
does not imply that public authorities must – or can – be indifferent
towards the results produced by the exercise of freedom of religion or
belief, or that they ignore completely the content of personal choices in
this particular area of human rationality. While neutrality vetoes state
judgments on strictly religious issues or doctrines, it does not preclude
state action with respect to religion, which may be based on other
judgments. In particular, the state may take into account the social
effects of the religious activity, or the predictable effects of religious
moral doctrines, including the situations in which those effects conflict
with the law or with values that the legal system considers essential
(consider, for instance, the case of religious groups that assert their
intention to impose their doctrines through violence if necessary, or that
preach violence or discrimination against some people).12
11 The notion of neutrality as state incompetence on religious matters may raise
some important questions with respect to European states that have established
churches. Certainly, as already indicated, the ECtHR has always understood
that the ECHR is compatible with such models of church-state relations. Two
interrelated reasons seem to justify such compatibility. One is the fact that those
systems of established churches must be understood in the light of the
particular history of the country; it would probably be incomprehensible, from
the perspective of current European standards, to constitute such systems now,
ex novo. The second reason is that, in practice, there is a high degree of
protection of religious freedom of individuals and groups in those countries,
and the state put a serious effort in preventing the system of established church
resulting in the discrimination of religious or belief minorities.
12 Those factors were decisive in the ECtHR’s judgment on the case Refah Partisi
and others v. Turkey, 31 July 2001 (chamber) and 13 February 2003 (Grand
Chamber), as well as in the decision Kalifatstaat v. Germany (decision on the
admissibility of Appl. No. 13828/04), 11 December 2006. The former involved
the dissolution of a large party of Islamic orientation by the Turkish
Constitutional Court. The latter referred to the illegalization of an Islamic
association by German authorities. For a comment on Refah Partisi, which is
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Two important consequences derive from the foregoing. First, state
action with regard to religion shall and must be, for the most part, a
legal action – i.e., an action precisely defined by law, with narrow
margin for public authorities’ discretion that could lead in practice to
value judgments on religious doctrines or customs. Second, neutrality
implies recognition of the reciprocal autonomy of state and religion;
therefore, state interference with religious autonomy must be reduced
to a minimum and its necessity must be clearly justified.13 We must
keep in mind that, as indicated above, neutrality is conceived not as an
aim in itself but as a means to guarantee and facilitate the exercise of
freedom of religion or belief by all individuals and groups on equal
grounds.
State Neutrality and Display of Religious Symbols in Public Places
or Institutions. 
With the background of this conceptual approach to state neutrality, we
can now turn back to the question of religious symbols, well illustrated
by the issue of the crucifix in public schools, which has been the subject
of a heated debate in some European countries since the mid 1990s.14
one of the most significant judgments of the ECtHR on the dissolution of
political parties, see C. Evans & C.A. Thomas, Church-State Relations in the
European Court of Human Rights, in BYU L. Rev. (2006), pp. 709-713; and the
chapters written, respectively, by A.E. Mayer, C. Moe, J. Gadirov & L. Lehnhof
in the volume Islam, Europe and Emerging Legal Issues (ed. by W.C. Durham,
R. Torfs, D.M Kirkham & C. Scott), Ashgate, Aldershot, 2012), pp. 209 et seq.
13 The ECtHR has often emphasized this idea since the late 1990s. See, especially,
the judgments cited supra, in note 10. However, in practice defining the limits
of religious autonomy is far from easy, as demonstrated by some ECtHR’s
cases of the last years concerning the labour relations between churches and
their employees. See, for example, Obst v. Germany and Schűth v. Germany,
both of 23 September 2010; see also Fernandez Martinez v. Spain, 15 May
2012 (currently on appeal before the Grand Chamber). For an interesting
comment on this type of cases and on which should be the right way to deal
with them from the ECHR perspective, when the German cases had not yet
been decided by the European Court, see G. Robbers, Church Autonomy in the
European Court of Human Rights: Recent Developments in Germany, in 26
Journal of Law and Religion (2010-2011), pp. 281-320.
14 See, for further details and references, in the context of analogous debates in
other European and American countries, R. NavarroValls & J. Martínez-
Torrón, Conflictos entre conciencia y ley..., cited in note 3, pp. 374-393. For a
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If the religious neutrality of the state is – from a pan-European
perspective – intimately and inextricably linked to the protection of
freedom of religion or belief, it follows that the display of religious
symbols in public places or institutions is not, per se, contrary to art. 9
of the European Convention of Human Rights, as far as individuals are
not subject to coercion or indoctrination.15
I mean this in the strictest possible sense, and therefore I must add two
nuances. 
First, a constitutional court may consider that the display of religious
symbols in some public institutions – for example, educational centres,
courtrooms, legislatures or town halls – is contrary to the constitutional
principles that define the relations between state and religion in its
country. However, the ECtHR is not competent to adjudicate on such
principles, this is the exclusive realm of national courts. As indicated
above, the aim of the European Convention is – and always was – to
protect freedoms and not to impose constitutional church-state models.
Second, I am not discussing here if the display of religious symbols in
public places or institutions is good or bad in order to foster mutual
respect and understanding between religions and beliefs in a plural
setting. Such discussion, taken seriously, would lead to numerous
distinctions (including different types of public places or institutions, as
well as different national contexts). It would also require analysing
complex questions that are far from the purpose of this paper. My point
is that, in the absence of coercion or indoctrination, it is not for the
courts – and even less for the ECtHR – to make choices with regard to
the display of religious symbols in the public sphere. Within the
democratic process, the decision about such displays is the domain of
useful source of documentation on the issue of the crucifix in Italy, with
interesting scholarly analysis from diverse perspectives, see La questione del
‘crocifisso’ (ed. by A.G. Chizzoniti), in the website Osservatorio delle libertà
ed istituzioni religiose: http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/75/index.php (accessed
26 October 2013).
15 The coercive factor was present, for example, in the case Buscarini and others
v. San Marino, 18 February 1999, in which the Court held that requiring newly
elected members of Parliament to swear allegiance to the Constitution on the
Gospels, on pain of forfeiting their parliamentary seats, was contrary to the
provisions of Art. 9 ECHR.
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public policies and hence the competence of other authorities. Those
decisions involve questions not susceptible of easy answers. Often they
are taken at the local level. Tradition plays a role, and certainly
installing a religious symbol ex novo is not the same as keeping it in the
place where it had been for ages; in a European context of religious
traditions influencing the shaping of the public sphere, both keeping
and removing a symbol have a meaning, neither of which can be
ignored. One-sided views are normally unfair and public authorities
must take into account a plurality of interests. In any event, the function
of the courts is not to substitute for the competent authorities on this
type of issues. They must limit themselves to be vigilant and ensure that
no rights are violated by decisions adopted by the legitimate authorities.
And, of course, if they find a violation of religious freedom, they must
provide the relevant evidence.
The mistake of the ECtHR in the chamber judgment in the Lautsi case
(Lautsi I)16 was, precisely, to take for granted that the mere display of
a traditional religious symbol in Italy – the crucifix – was a violation of
the religious freedom of the students opposing to it and of the parents’
rights under article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR.17 For the Court,
16 Lautsi v. Italy, 3 November 2009. Among the immense legal literature
generated by this case, see, from different perspectives, and with reference to
the chamber’s judgment, P. Annicchino, Is the glass half empty or half full?
Lautsi v. Italy before the European Court of Human Rights, in Stato, Chiese e
Pluralismo confessionale (May 2010), pp. 1-19 (www.statoechiese.it); S. 
Cañamares Arribas, La cruz de Estrasburgo. en torno a la sentencia Lautsi v.
Italia, del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, in 22 Revista General de
Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesi· stico (2010), pp. 1-13; N. Colaianni, Il
crocifisso in giro per l’Europa: da Roma a Strasburgo (e ritorno), in 24 Revista
General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesi· stico del Estado (2010), pp.
1-26J; S. Műckl, Crucifijos en las aulas: ølesión a los derechos
fundamentales?, in 23 Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho
Eclesi· stico del Estado (2010), pp. 1-15 (comparing Lautsi with the case law
of the German Federal Constitutional Law); D. Ranieri, Notable reacción
europea ante otro intento laicista. El crucifijo en las escuelas italianas y la
Corte de Estrasburgo, in 68-69 Prudentia Iuris (2010), pp. 247-280; H.H.
Weiler, Crucifix in the Classroom Redux, in 21-1 European Journal of
International Law (2010), pp. 1-6.
17 This is the text of Art. 2 of the Protocol to the ECHR: ‘No person shall be
denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes 
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the crucifix was a ‘powerful’ symbol with remarkable potential impact
on young students, and with a primarily religious meaning. Therefore,
its presence in the school premises could be emotionally disturbing for
some students and was restrictive of the parents’ rights to decide the
orientation of their children’s education and incompatible with the
neutrality that must preside the public school environment.18 Naturally,
the logical consequence of this rationale would be the removal of
crucifixes from all public schools in Italy (and probably elsewhere).
Implicit in that approach was a notion of neutrality as exclusion of
religion from the public space, at least in the educational milieu. Such
understanding of neutrality is, of course, a legitimate option but it is not
the only legitimate option, and it is not for the courts – even less for the
ECtHR – to impose their own choices on such a delicate issue. 
Ultimately, by making mandatory the exclusive concept of religious
neutrality, Lautsi I axiomatically accepted a very debatable distinction
between believers and non-believers, attaching the latter to the realm of
reason and the former to the realm of non-rational belief. From this
departure point, the logical corollary was that the particular symbols of
a religion did not have a place in the sphere of public education. In this
respect, it is interesting to note that a substantial part of the rationale of
Lautsi I replicates the ECtHR’s argument in Leyla Şahin and other
cases that adopt a similar approach with regard to the wearing of an
in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own
religious and philosophical convictions.’ As is well known, the Lautsi case is a
result of a heated public and legal debate in Italy in the last decade about the
display of the crucifix in public schools’ classrooms. The applicant was the
mother of two students of a public school (aged 13 and 11 at the time), who
unsuccessfully had asked the school’s governors to remove crucifixes from
classrooms – the Italian law prescribes that there shall be a crucifix on the wall
of public schools classrooms. The mother claimed that the presence of that
religious symbol was against the constitutional principle of secularity (laicità),
in which she wished to educate her children. A chamber of the ECtHR decided
unanimously in favour of the applicant, considering that there had been a
violation of Article 2 of the First Protocol to the Convention in connection with
Article 9 ECHR. The judgment was reversed on appeal by the ECtHR’s Grand
Chamber.
18 See especially Lautsi I, ß 57.
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Islamic headscarf or other personal clothing of religious significance.19
One of the reasons utilized to support the states’ restrictive policies on
personal religious garments at school was that such expressions of
religiosity could lead to tension or ‘pressure’ on other students. 
In my opinion, Lautsi I, like the ECtHR’s decisions on Islamic
headscarf cases, transmit the implicit message that imposing the
absence of religious visible elements, at least in public schools, is a
necessary consequence of state neutrality as guarantee of freedom of
thought, conscience and religion. The underlying assumption appears
to be that religion is a factor of potential conflicts, and perhaps
provocation, leading easily to confrontation and social tension. Hence
the best choice would be to eliminate its visible features, and state
neutrality would require the protection of the individual right to build
‘uncontaminated’ educational environments free from religion. From
19 See Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, 29 June 2004 (chamber’s decision), and Leyla Şahin
v. Turkey, 10 November 2005 (Grand Chamber’s decision). For some
comments on this case, among the immense legal literature it has generated, see
the chapters written, respectively, by T.J. Gunn, N. Hostmaelingen, T.
Lindholm, J. Martínez-Torrón & I.T. Plesner in the volume Islam, Europe and
Emerging Legal Issues, cited in note 12; N. Lerner, How Wide the Margin of
Appreciation? The Turkish Headscarf Case, the Strasbourg Court, and
Secularist Tolerance, in 13 Willamette Journal of International Law and
Dispute Resolutions (2005), pp. 65-85; B. Chelini-Pont & E. Tawil, Brèves
remarques sur l’arrĕt Leyla Sahin, in 2 Annuaire Droit e Religions (2006-
2007), pp. 607-611. Other important cases related to Islamic headscarves or
analogous religious clothing are: Dogru c. Francia, and Kervanci c. Francia,
both of 4 December 2008; Dahlab v. Switzerland, decision on the admissibility
of Appl. No. 42393/98, 15 February 2001; Kőse and 93 other applicants v.
Turkey, decision on the admissibility of Appl. No. 26625/02, 24 January 2006;
Kurtulmus v. Turkey, decision on the admissibility of App. No. 65500/01, 24
January 2006; and six almost identical decisions of inadmissibility of 30 June
2009: Aktas v. France, Appl. No. 43563/08, Bayrak v. France, Appl. No.
14308/08, Gamaleddyn v. France, Appl. No. 18527/08; Ghazal v. France,
Appl. No. 29134/08, Jasvir Singh v. France, Appl. No. 25463/08, and Ranjit
Singh v. France, Appl. No. 27561/08 (the six decisions involved applications
by students punished in application of the 2004 French law that prohibits
‘visible’ personal religious symbols in public schools: four of them were
female Muslims wearing a hijab and two of them were male Sikhs wearing a
keski, which is a more discreet garb usually worn under the turban
characteristic of Sikhs). 
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such a perspective, the state would become obliged to eliminate the
possibility of conflict by prohibiting every visible religious symbol
(when in reality conflicts and confrontation are normally produced not
by religious symbols but rather by those who assert their absolute right
to erase those symbols from their sight, so that they are not exposed to
its presence or alleged influence). One of the predictable results of this
position is that in practice non-religious ideas enjoy a superior position
over religious ideas. In other words, it could lead to a design of public
spaces in which an atheist can feel more comfortable than a religious
believer.20
At the same time, it is not easy to understand how such a conception of
state neutrality, with respect both to personal and to institutional
symbols, can contribute to build the pluralist, inclusive and objective
educational environment that Lautsi I mentions.21 Indeed, the effect of
eliminating the visibility of the religious is to exclude and hide an
important part of pluralism as well as to create a fictitious school
setting, separated from the complexities of real life.22 Such a school
setting would not be indeed neutral, for it may transmit the subliminal
message that religion, being potentially conflictive, has its place out of
the school but not inside it (with the implication that atheism and
agnosticism are in the opposite end of the spectrum, i.e., are considered
as non-conflictive ideas, and therefore ‘acceptable’ at school).
Fortunately, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR overruled the chamber’s
decision one and a half years later (Lautsi II).23 In Lautsi II, the Court
rejected the idea that the exclusive notion of neutrality proposed by the
20 See R. Puza, La Cour constitutionnelle, la Bavière et le crucifix dans les
Ècoles, in 45 Revue de droit canonique (1995), pp. 373 ss., commenting the
1995 decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the crucifix in
public schools in Bavaria. 
21 See Lautsi I, ß 47.c).
22 See in this regard M.D. Evans, Manual on the wearing of religious symbols in
public areas, Council of Europe-Martinus Nijoff, Leiden, 2008, especially pp.
59 et seq. and 89 et seq. 
23 Lautsi v. Italy (Grand Chamber), 18 March 2011. The Lautsi case has been –
and keeps being – commented on by scholars from very diverse positions. See,
among Italian scholars, after the Grand Chamber’s decision, and from different
perspectives, V. Turchi, La pronuncia della Grande Chambre della Corte di
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chamber was the only acceptable one, and pointed out that neutrality
could also be achieved by a school environment that is inclusive and
therefore open to visible expressions of both majority and minority
religions or worldviews.24 According to the Grand Chamber, the
decision about the presence of religious symbols in public schools falls
within the State margin of appreciation. The Court was not expressing
agreement (or disagreement) with the Italian government or with the
Italian law on crucifixes in public schools. Its only function was to
determine if there had been a violation of religious freedom. The
ECtHR concluded that Italy was entitled to choose its own symbols and
that, in the absence of coercion, intolerance or indoctrination of persons
thinking differently, the Court cannot interfere with choices
legitimately adopted in accordance with the Italian democratic
legislative process. 
Should Religious Minorities be empowered to Re-Shape the Public
Sphere? 
Together with the meaning of the religious neutrality of the state, the
Strasburgo sul caso Lautsi C. Italia: post nubila Phoebus, in Stato, Chiese e
pluralismo confessionale (October 2011), where further bibliographical
references, especially to Italian legal literature, can be found; and P. Ronchi,
Crucifixes, Margin of Appreciation and Consensus: The Grand Chamber
Ruling in Lautsi v Italy, in  13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal (2011), pp. 287-297.
See also, comparing the Strasbourg and the US approach to institutional
religious symbols, J. Witte, Jr. & N.L. Arold, ‘Lift High the Cross’?
Contrasting the New European and American Cases on Religious Symbols on
Government Property, in 25 Emory Int’l L. Rev. (2011), pp. 5-55; and a critical
view of Lautsi II, in the light of Canadian law and putting the European case
law into a socio-cultural perspective, L. Beaman, Battles over Symbols: The
‘Religion’ of the Minority versus the ‘Culture’ of the Majority, in 28 The
Journal of Law and Religion (2012-2013), pp. 67 et seq.. In Spain, see I. MartÌn
Sánchez, El caso Lautsi ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, in 28
Anuario de Derecho Eclesi· stico del Estado (2012), pp. 215-252; S.
Cañamares Arribas, Los símbolos religiosos en el espacio público: entre la
amenaza real y la mera sospecha, in 20 El Cronista del Estado Social y
Democr· tico de Derecho (April 2011), pp. 60-67; S. Meseguer Velasco,
SÌmbolos religiosos en colegios públicos: ¿hacia dónde camina la
jurisprudencia europea?, in 5 Anuario JurÌdico Villanueva (2011), pp. 202-
213.
24 See especially Lautsi II, ß74. 
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main question present in Lautsi was whether religious minorities – or
individuals – have the right to re-shape the public sphere when they feel
offended by the display of the symbols that express the beliefs – or just
the traditions – of the religious majority, with which they profoundly
disagree.
The response of Lautsi I was affirmative,25 and the chamber
categorically assumed that, in a public school, students’ freedom of
religion or belief implies a negative dimension consisting in their right
not to be ‘exposed’ to the presence of a religious symbol that some may
find alien or even offensive. The argument was analogous to that used
in the Islamic headscarf cases (which not coincidentally are often cited
in that decision); i.e., religious symbols must be avoided in the public
school environment because of the hypothetical pressure they must
cause on the students disagreeing with or opposing to the meaning of
those symbols. 
This argument does not seem very persuasive, taking into account the
‘static’ or ‘passive’ symbol of the crucifix and the absence – as in the
case of Islamic headscarf – of any proselytizing intention or effect.26
There was no evidence at all that the presence of that Christian symbol
was utilized in practice to affirm the ‘superiority’ of the majority
religion in Italy, to indoctrinate students or to foster conversions. On
the other hand, the chamber’s reasoning seems also in contradiction
with the previous case law of the ECtHR that held – in my view with
all good reason – that the religious freedom of the believers of a certain
religion – be it a majority or minority religion – does not confer on
them the right to be exempt from criticism or to be free from the
influence of contrary or even hostile ideas.27
Those holdings of the chamber were corrected by the Grand Chamber
in Lautsi II, with which I essentially agree. The Court noted that the
mere display of a crucifix in classrooms, as a sign of the religion of the
25 See Lautsi I, ßß 53-55.
26 See in this regard, the essays, cited in note 16, written by S. CaÒamares
Arribas, pp. 6-7, and S. M¸ckl, pp. 8-10. 
27 See Otto-Preminger-Institut c. Austria, 20 September 1994, ß 47. See, for
further references and bibliography, J. Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Expression
versus Freedom of Religion in the European Court of human Rights, in
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majority of the Italian population, was not sufficient to conclude that
there was a process of indoctrination, and even less taking into account
that the Italian school environment was open to practices and visible
expressions of other minority religions; for instance, students could
freely wear Islamic headscarves, and optional religious instruction in
creeds other than Catholic could be organized at school.28 Briefly but
clearly, the ECtHR held that the subjective feeling of some students
about the crucifix was not in itself sufficient to establish a breach of the
European Convention and to challenge the legitimacy of a school
setting that was objectively built according to an open and inclusive
concept of neutrality.29
In my opinion, Lautsi II would have been even better if it had
elaborated on some points remarked in the concurring opinions of two
judges. On the one hand, it would have been useful if the Court had
made it clearer that the value protected by the Convention is religious
freedom and not secularity, notwithstanding how legitimate and
traditional may the latter be in some European States.30 As indicated
above in this paper, strict separation between state and religion is not
included in the ECHR, but only the state neutrality conceived as a
condition for the respect for religious freedom. On the other hand, the
Court could have developed the idea that coercion should be the test for
a violation of freedom of religion or belief, and not the subjective
feeling of offence experienced by some persons in the presence of some
religious symbols. Just as religious believers do not have the right to be
‘Censorial Sensitivities: Free Speech and Religion in a Fundamentalist World’
(ed. by A. Sajó), Eleven, The Netherlands, 2007, especially pp. 238-239. With
this same orientation, the German Federal Constitutional Court, in 2003,
rejected the claim of a father demanding that the table blessing in the local
elementary school attended by his son had to be discontinued, for he was an
atheist and those prayers violated his ideological freedom. Among other things,
the German Court affirmed: ‘it is not unconstitutional that all children,
including those with parents of atheistic convictions, know since their
childhood that there are in society people with religious beliefs that wish to
practice their beliefs’. See BVerfGE, 1BvR 1522/03 vom 2.10.2003, Absatz-Nr.
(1-11).
28 See especially Lautsi II, ßß 70-72, 74.
29 See especially Lautsi II, ß 66.
30 Cf. concurring opinion of Judge Bonello.
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free from criticism, atheistic believers do not have the right to be free
from exposure to symbols – personal or institutional – that may offend
their convictions or feelings.31
Such a development would have been helpful to counteract the curious
rationale of the chamber in Lautsi I, focused on the (often hypothetical)
subjective feelings of individuals. According to the chamber, religious
symbols would not have a place in a public school because they could
generate in the students the perception that they are brought up in a
milieu marked by a particular religion – allegedly, this religion would
be perceived as the state’s favourite, which would be ‘emotionally
disturbing for pupils of other religions or those who profess no
religion’.32 Such juridical reasoning centred on emotions and
subjectivity is, in my view, a slippery surface, not exempt from risks
and imprecisions, which reminds of the questionable criterion of the
‘reasonable observer’ created by the US Supreme Court.33
On the one hand, Lautsi I took for granted that the presence of the
symbol could ‘objectively’ cause ‘emotional disturbance’ to students
that do not share the belief of the majority. However, the reality is that
each person has, towards religious symbols, diverse (and mutable)
feelings and reactions. Indeed, the vast majority of people with atheistic
or agnostic beliefs do not express any objection against religious
symbols. Their usual reaction is indifference, sometimes accompanied
31 See concurring opinion of Judge Power.
32 See Lautsi I, ßß 54-55. A similar stance was adopted by a first instance court in
Spain in 2008, when a ‘secular cultural association’ of the city of Valladolid
required that the school board remove crucifixes from all common areas of the
school. The main argument utilized by the court was that the display of
religious symbols in an educational centre attended by minors could generate
in the students the ëfeeling’ that the state is ‘closer’ to the Christian religion
than to other worldviews (Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo N∫ 2,
sentencia n∫ 288/2008, 14 November 2008). I must note that in Spain there is
no law comparable to the Italian law on crucifixes. No provision obliges public
schools to place crucifixes or any other religious symbols in classrooms or
other school areas. However, the school board can take that decision. In
practice, there are no religious symbols in most public schools in Spain,
although in some of the oldest ones – where crucifixes used to be displayed –
they have been kept out of respect for the school tradition.
33 See, among others, the bibliography cited in note 8. 
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by their respect for the beliefs of others and by their realization that
they are often a minority in a place in which the majority belief is other
(which is not a negative fact in itself, provided that public authorities
ensure that minorities are not discriminated in practice). Seldom do
people articulate their atheism or agnosticism as intolerance of the
presence of visible objects that symbolize religious ideas that they hate,
despise or simply consider false. 
On the other hand, we should apply to this issue the same criteria that
are applicable to the cases in which people, in the use of their freedom
of expression, use a language that is offensive to the religious
sentiments of other people.34 Law does not immunize individuals
against mere offence. Law protects freedoms and rights, but not
feelings or emotions. Law must be based on facts and on objective
criteria, and feelings are, by nature, subjective and variable. Therefore,
in order to determine whether the display of a religious symbol violates
the religious freedom of those opposing the symbol, the test should be
aimed at identifying the possible existence of coercion or indoctrination
– which is another form of coercion – and not on the subjective feeling
of offence alleged by dissenters.35 If a court could grant to opponents
of a religious symbol of majoritarian support the right to eliminate the
visibility of such symbols, it would be empowering those people to
impose their will, and their notion of ‘educational habitat’, on the
majority. 
Does the foregoing entail that, from the perspective of the European
34 See, on this topic, J. Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Expression versus Freedom
of Religion in the European Court of human Rights, ‘Censorial Sensitivities:
Free Speech and Religion in a Fundamentalist World’ (ed. by A. Sajó), Eleven,
The Netherlands, 2007, pp. 233-269.
35 As the concurring opinion of Judge Power in Lautsi II put it: ‘The test of a
violation under Article 9 is not ‘offence’ but ‘coercion’. That article does not
create a right not to be offended by the manifestation of the religious beliefs of
others even where those beliefs are given ‘preponderant visibility’ by the State.
The display of a religious symbol does not compel or coerce an individual to
do or to refrain from doing anything. It does not require engagement in any
activity though it may, conceivably, invite or stimulate discussion and an open
exchange of views. It does not prevent an individual from following his or her
own conscience nor does it make it unfeasible for such a person to manifest his
or her own religious beliefs and ideas’.
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Convention on Human Rights, minorities, or individuals, are bound to
respect the majority decisions concerning the display of religious
symbols in public places? My answer is definitely affirmative, as far as
there is no coercion or indoctrination attached to such display – such
would be the case, for instance, when a specific act of reverence or
worship is required,36 or when those religious symbols are used to
promote intolerance or discrimination of dissenters, be they atheists,
agnostics or believers of other religions. Religion, and its symbols, are
part of the culture and should be treated as such – which is not the same
as affirming that the crucifix is a cultural symbol, as the Italian Council
of State did.37
The Position of Spanish and German Courts 
This, indeed, has been the predominant line of reasoning in the Spanish
jurisprudence, which has been very open to the maintenance of
religious traditions in public places or institutions, and at the same time
very firm in proclaiming that no person can be obliged to take an active
part in those traditions.38
Thus, the Spanish Constitutional Court has held that state neutrality is
compatible with the presence of Christian symbols in public
corporations, as far as they are linked to the history of the institution
and imply neither the adherence of the state to a particular creed nor
36 Such was the situation in Buscarini, cited in note 15. 
37 See Consiglio di Stato - Sez. VI. Sentenza n. 556/2006, 13 February 2006.
38 Among the Spanish legal literature on these issues, see S. Cañamares Arribas,
Tratamiento de la simbología religiosa en el Derecho español: propuestas ante
la reforma de la Ley orgánica de libertad religiosa, in 19 Revista General de
Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado (2009), pp. 1-29; A.
González-Varas Ibáñez, Los actos religiosos en las escuelas públicas en el
derecho español y comparado, in 19 Revista General de Derecho Canónico y
Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado (2009), pp. 1-28; G. Moreno Botella, Crucifijo
y escuela en España, in 2 Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho
Eclesiástico del Estado (2003), pp. 1-34. See also I. Briones, Los símbolos
religiosos como signos de identidad y de discordia. De la libertad de
conciencia y de expresión del individuo a las tradiciones religiosas de un
pueblo; L. Martín-Retortillo, Símbolos religiosos en actos y espacios
institucionales; and A. Ollero, Símbolos religiosos, poder, razón: una reflexión
político-jurídica; all of them in 28 Anuario de Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado
(2012).
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any coercion on the religious freedom of individuals. For instance, the
Court has found nothing unconstitutional in the fact that a military
garrison organized a solemn parade in honour of the local advocation
of the Holy Virgin,39 or in the fact that a unit of the National Police
participated in a religious procession during the celebration of the
Catholic Holy Week – not to guarantee the safety of the event but in its
quality of a member of the relevant religious fraternity, with police
officers wearing their gala uniforms.40 However, the Court has made
clear that no officer can be obliged to be present in those religious
ceremonies against his personal convictions, for public events
reflecting a religious tradition must be reconciled with the individuals’
freedom of conscience.
For analogous reasons, the Constitutional Court held that it would have
been legitimate for the University of Valencia – a public University –
to keep an image of the Holy Virgin that had been traditionally present
in its coat of arms, if the University governing bodies had so decided.41
And, more recently, the Court has sustained the constitutionality of the
statutes of the Bar Association of Seville, which have kept, as ‘a secular
tradition’, the Immaculate Conception of the Holy Virgin as its
honorary patron.42 The Court noted that, the Bar Association being
itself aconfessional, preserving this tradition does not infringe either
the neutrality of public institutions or the religious freedom of non-
Christians. The Court added that symbols reflect the history of
institutions, and it is natural to find in the Spanish culture plenty of
symbols, with religious connotations, that represent public institutions.
Furthermore, the Court observed that in contemporary societies passive
39 See STC 177/1996.
40 See STC 101/2004.
41 See STC 130/1991. In this case, the supreme governing body of the University
had decided the opposite, i.e., to remove the image of the Virgin from the coat
of arms. See J. Martínez-Torrón, Freedom of Religion in the Case Law of the
Spanish Constitutional Court, in BYU L. Rev. (2001), pp. 720-724; S.
Cañamares Arribas, Religious Symbols in Spain: A Legal Perspective, in 11
Ecclesiastical Law Journal (2009), pp. 189-191.
42 See STC 34/2011. See T. Prieto Álvarez, Colegios profesionales,
aconfesionalidad y patronazgo religioso. Comentario a la STC de 28 de marzo
de 2011, in 79 Revista Andaluza de Administración Pública (2011), pp. 137-
156.
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symbols have virtually no influence on people’s beliefs and, therefore,
the religious freedom of individuals is safe, provided that no one is
compelled to participate in rites or ceremonies in honour of those
symbols. In the absence of such coercion – the Court concluded – the
mere subjective perception of offence is not sufficient to appreciate that
freedom of ideology or religion has been violated.
A comparable position was adopted by the Superior Court of Justice of
Valencia in 2011,43 when it refused to decree the removal of a huge
cross placed on a mountain since the eighteenth century and rebuilt
several times by popular initiative. The Court declared that ‘in our
country, as in many others of similar cultural and religious traditions…,
there is a visible presence of religious symbols in public places …; their
maintenance is just a manifestation of respect for those traditions and
not an imposition of particular religious beliefs, and therefore they
cannot be understood as expressing intolerance of non-believers’.44
Another interesting case – widely spread by the media – concerning the
presence of the crucifix in a public space, and more precisely in the city
hall of Saragossa, was decided in 2010 by a court of first instance.45 A
group of left-wing councilmen demanded that the mayor should order
the removal of an old crucifix from the plenary hall, where the city
council meetings were usually held. The mayor – of the Socialist Party
– refused to remove the crucifix, making reference to its historical and
artistic value as well as to the significance of respect for traditions –
that the particular crucifix was linked to the life of the Saragossa’s city
council since the 17th century. The issue was put to a vote and the
majority of the council decided in favour of keeping the crucifix. The
court of first instance confirmed the legitimacy of the council’s
decision. Interestingly, the court analysed the issue from the
perspective of judicial self-restraint. For the court, the right question
was not how or if the council could justify the display of a historic
crucifix in the plenary hall but, on the contrary, to elucidate if there was
43 STSJ Valencia 648/2011 (Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo, Sección 5ª),
6 September 2011.
44 Ibid., FJ 9.
45 Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo Nr. 3 of Saragossa, Judgment Nr.
156/10, 30 April 2010.
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any reason why a court must prohibit the council from having that
crucifix in its plenary hall. The court did not find any reason for the
prohibition, considering that the principle of secularity does not entail
erasing the visibility of religion from public life, and noting that the
display of the crucifix was not aimed at imposing a particular religion
over other religions or beliefs – it simply reflected the history of a city
council more than nine centuries old. 
In the educational environment, another case that attracted considerable
media attention was resolved by a decision of the Superior Court of
Castile and Léon in 2009.46 Its origin was a complaint about the
crucifixes that hung on the classrooms of a public school in Valladolid.
A cultural ‘secular’ association, following the unsuccessful request of
some students’ parents to the school board, demanded that the
crucifixes should be removed from all classes and common spaces of
the school. The court of first instance decided in favour of the plaintiffs
and ordered the immediate removal of all the crucifixes, on the ground
that the display of religious symbols in an educational centre could
generate in young students the ‘feeling’ that the state was ‘closer’ to the
Christian religions than to other worldviews.47 On appeal, the Superior
Court partially overruled  the first instance decision. On the one hand,
the Court rejected – as contrary to Article 16 of the Constitution and to
the case law of the Constitutional Court – any ‘maximalist’ or
‘extreme’ interpretation of the constitutional principle of secularity
(laicidad) that prompted to erase all traces of religion from public life.
On the other hand, the Court held that state neutrality obliged to take
away from school those religious symbols whose presence could be
‘emotionally disturbing’ for students and contrary to the parents’ rights
to have their children educated in accordance with their convictions. As
a consequence, in a sort of Solomonic judgment, the Court decreed that
crucifixes should be removed only from the school common areas and
from those classrooms attended by students whose parents had
explicitly complained about their presence; they could remain in the
rest of rooms if the school board so determined. It is interesting to note
46 STSJ Castilla y León 3250/2009 (Sala de lo Contencioso-Administrativo,
Sección 3ª), 14 December 2009.
47 See Juzgado de lo Contencioso-Administrativo Nr. 2 of Valladolid, Judgment
Nr. 288/2008, 14 November 2008, FJ 4.
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that the Superior Court’s judgment was openly grounded on the
ECtHR’s decision Lautsi I. Had Lautsi II already been rendered –
overruling the chamber’s decision – we may conjecture that the Court
might have decided differently.
In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court has adopted a stance
closer to an exclusive notion of state neutrality, although giving some
margin of appreciation to the states (Länder) to accommodate the
differing views with respect to the display of religious symbols in
public schools. 
One of the main conflicts was raised, two decades ago, when some
students’ parents challenged the Bavarian laws according to which a
crucifix had to be placed on the wall of every classroom of public
schools. The parents, of anthroposophical convictions, argued that they
did not want their children exposed to the daily influence of a religious
symbol consisting in the representation of a ‘human agonizing body’.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht declared that aspect of Bavarian law
unconstitutional, in a judgment that has received numerous criticisms
by German scholars.48 Among other things, it has been noted that the
alleged moral conflict of the students could have been prevented, or
accommodated, in other ways which would be more appropriate in
generating  an atmosphere of reciprocal tolerance between diverging
worldviews. For instance, the crucifix could have been removed from
that particular classroom, or moved to a place in the classroom where
48 BVerfG, 1 BvR 1087/91 vom 16.05.1995. For an analysis of this judgment and
its consequences, see A. Hollerbach et al., Das Kreuz im Widerspruch: der
Kruzifix-Beschluss des Bundesverfassungsgerichts in der Kontroverse (ed. by
H. Maier), Herder, Freiburg i. Br., 1996. See also A. von Campenhausen, Zur
Kruzifix-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, in 121 Archiv des
őffentlichen Rechts (1996), pp. 448-464; J. Isensee, Bildersturm durch
Grundrechtsinterpretation. Der Kruzifix-Beschlufl des BVerfG, in Zeitschrift
fűr Rechtspolitik (1996), pp. 10 et seq.; D. Merten, Der Kruzifix-Beschlufl des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts aus grundrechtsdogmatischer Sicht, in
‘Verfassungsstaatlichkeit, Festschrift fűr Klaus Stern zum 65. Geburtstag’ (ed.
by J. Burmeister), Beck, Műnchen, 1997, pp. 987 et seq.; D. Pirson, Kruzifix in
Unterrichtsräumen, in Bayerische Verwaltungsblätter (1995), pp. 755-758. In
Spain, see T. Prieto Álvarez, Libertad religiosa y espacios públicos. Laicidad,
pluralismo, símbolos, Thomson-Civitas, Cizur Menor, 2010, pp. 81-88 y 126-
129.
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it would not be noticeable by the objector students. Indeed, such had
been the practice of the Court in similar conflicts until then.49 A few
months after the judgment, the Bavarian government modified the law
on public schools in order to keep the display of crucifixes in
classrooms. When there is an objection by some student – or his parents
– the school authorities shall seek an agreed solution to the conflict;
and, if this proves to be not possible, they will endeavour to find a
balance between the diverging religious and ideological convictions of
the students, without losing sight of the majority position.50
A more hesitant stance towards neutrality was adopted by the Federal
Constitutional Court in the Ludin case, in 2003, with respect to the
wearing of personal religious symbols in public schools, in particular
the Islamic headscarf, or hijab, by a female teacher.51 The conflict was
raised by a Muslim woman, born in Afghanistan and a legal resident in
Germany since 1987, who had passed the public examination necessary
to take the position of primary school teacher. The education authorities
49 See G. Robbers, Religious Freedom in Germany, in ‘La libertad religiosa y de
conciencia ante la justicia constitucional’ (ed. by J. MartÌnez-TorrÛn),
Comares, Granada, 1998, pp. 203-204.
50 Art. 7.3 of the Bayerisches Gesetz über das Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesen
(BayEUG): “Angesichts der geschichtlichen und kulturellen Prägung Bayerns
wird in jedem Klassenraum ein Kreuz angebracht. Damit kommt der Wille zum
Ausdruck, die obersten Bildungsziele der Verfassung auf der Grundlage
christlicher und abendländischer Werte unter Wahrung der Glaubensfreiheit zu
verwirklichen. Wird der Anbringung des Kreuzes aus ernsthaften und
einsehbaren Gründen des Glaubens oder der Weltanschauung durch die
Erziehungsberechtigten widersprochen, versucht die Schulleiterin bzw. der
Schulleiter eine gütliche Einigung. Gelingt eine Einigung nicht, hat sie bzw. er
nach Unterrichtung des Schulamts für den Einzelfall eine Regelung zu treffen,
welche die Glaubensfreiheit des Widersprechenden achtet und die religiösen
und weltanschaulichen Überzeugungen aller in der Klasse Betroffenen zu
einem gerechten Ausgleich bringt; dabei ist auch der Wille der Mehrheit,
soweit möglich, zu berücksichtigen.”
51 BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02 vom 3.6.2003, Absatz-Nr. (1-140). In Spain, this
judgment has been analysed by M.A. Martín Vida & S. Műller-Grune, ¿Puede
una maestra portar durante las clases en una escuela pública un pañuelo en la
cabeza por motivos religiosos?, en REDCo 70 (2004), pp. 313-336; I. Briones,
El uso del velo islámico en Europa: un conflicto de libertad religiosa y de
conciencia, in 10 Anuario de Derechos Humanos - Nueva …poca (2009), pp.
35-42; A. López-Sidro, Breve comentario sobre la sentencia del Tribunal
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of Baden-Württemberg – one of the German Länder – excluded her
from the possibility of having such a position at public schools, because
of her firm decision to wear a hijab while teaching, despite the fact that
she was equally determined to avoid all kinds of indoctrination or
proselytism. The state authorities alleged that the Islamic headscarf was
a political and religious symbol, incompatible with the neutrality that
should permeate the German system of public schools. The plaintiff
rejected a notion of state neutrality consisting in the eradication of
visible symbols of religious or philosophical ideas, and claimed that
true neutrality cannot lead to conceal from students the religious
plurality actually existing in German contemporary society. Moreover,
she declared that never in her teaching experience had she experienced
any situation of tension with her students or with their parents for
reason of her hijab.
A divided Court decided in favour of the plaintiff,52 with a reasoning
that has raised some doubts among many German scholars. The Court
admitted that there were constitutional rights and values – state
neutrality, as well as the parents’ and the students’ rights – that could
justify a limitation on the plaintiff’s religious freedom, including her
disqualification from teaching at public schools, provided that there
was a sufficiently specified legal basis. According to the majority of the
Court, such specific legal basis was lacking in this case, and therefore
Constitucional Federal de Alemania, de 24 de septiembre de 2003 (2 BvR
1436/02), sobre el velo islámico de una profesora en centro escolar público, in
3 Revista General de Derecho Canónico y Derecho Eclesiástico del Estado
(2003), pp. 1-3; J. Rossell, La cuestión del velo islámico y la vestimenta
religiosa en la República Federal de Alemania, in ‘El pañuelo islámico en
Europa’ (ed. by A. Motilla), Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2009, pp. 187-193. Among
German legal literature, see G. Robbers, ‘Muslimische Lehrerinnen, das
Kopftuch und das deutsche Bundesverfassungsgericht’, in 50 Österreichisches
Archiv fúr Recht & Religion (2003), pp. 405-417; S. Muckel, Der Islam im
Staatskirchenrecht des Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in ‘Religionsfreiheit als
Leitbild. Staatskirchenrecht in Deutschland und Europa im Prozess der
Reform’ (ed. by H. Kress), Lit, Műnster, 2004, pp. 119-139; J. Bader, Cuius
regio, eius religio - Wessen Land, dessen Religion, in 43 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift (2004), pp. 3092-3094; and, before the Constitutional Court’s
judgment, S. M¸ckl, Religionsfreiheit und Sonderstatusverhältnisse -
Kopftuchverbot fűr Lehrerinnen?, in 40 Der Staat (2001), pp. 96-127.
52 The decision was taken by five votes to three.
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a sole ‘abstract danger’ for those other legal interests was not sufficient
to justify a restriction on a constitutional right. The Constitutional
Court emphasized three points. First, there are legal interests that
undoubtedly can support imposing on teachers of public schools a
prohibition from wearing a hijab. Second, those interests must be
grounded on a specific legislative provision. And third, the states
(Länder), by virtue of their competences on education, can enact laws
that prohibit teachers from wearing personal religious symbols at
school. For the Court, the states are free to legislate on such a sensitive
issue in an increasingly plural society, for plurality is positive as far as
it facilitates tolerance and open-mindedness, but may have some
problematic aspects and constitute a potential source of conflicts.
A number of German states understood the Ludin judgment as an
invitation to legislate on the issue as they considered appropriate,
beginning by Baden-Württemberg, which modified its law on
education six months after the judgment53 in order to forbid every
external expression by teachers that could harm the state neutrality vis-
à-vis the students or their parents. In particular, the law prohibits all
behaviour that may lead to conclude that a teacher is violating human
dignity, the equality of rights, fundamental rights or democratic order.
Until now, eight out of sixteen Länder have enacted laws on this matter,
with diverse nuances.54 Experience, however, demonstrates that this
legislation will not necessarily end judicial conflicts on the issue of
Islamic headscarves, where sometimes plaintiffs demand equal
treatment with Catholic nuns who are permitted to wear their habits
while teaching.55
53 More precisely, Art. 38 of its Law on Schools (Schulgesetz). See A. Torres,
Neutralidad del Estado y empleo de los símbolos religiosos en centros públicos
en Alemania: la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional Alemán de 24 de
septiembre de 2003, in 5 Laicidad y libertades (2005), pp. 295-297.
54 For an interesting source of information and documentation on the evolution of
the laws enacted by the German states (Länder) after the Federal Constitutional
Court’s judgment, see the Internet pages of the Institut fűr europäisches
Verfassungsrecht of the University of Trier: http://www.uni-
trier.de/index.php?id=24373 (accessed 26 October 2013). See also, in Spain, J.
Rossell, La cuestiän del velo islámico…, cit. in note 51, pp. 193 et seq.
55 See, for further details and references, R. Navarro-Valls & J. MartÌnez-TorrÛn,
Conflictos entre conciencia y ley…, cited in note 3, pp. 354-355.
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Conclusion 
In the light of the preceding discussion, and in the light also of the
current debates about the place of religion in public life that are
developing in Europe, and generally in the West, one may wonder if the
display of a particular religious symbol in a public space – a symbol of
the majority religion in the country – is the best way to promote
pluralism and mutual respect between different religious and belief
communities. A direct and unconditional affirmative response would be
certainly questionable, and a number of distinctions and nuances
should be taken into account. For instance, it would be important to
differentiate between the various types of public spaces, to determine
who took the initiative to set the symbol in a public place, or to consider
if the symbol can be easily removed upon request and if other religious
symbols are allowed in the same area. A small crucifix on the wall of a
hospital, which can be easily detached or substituted by a symbol of
another religion, is definitely not the same as a big cross presiding at a
courtroom.
In any event, as has been repeatedly mentioned in this paper, it is not
for the courts to decide on public policies regarding religious symbols,
and even less for the European Court of Human Rights. Courts are not
policy makers. Their role is to apply the law of the land, to adjudicate
on rights. In the case of the ECtHR, its role is to decide if the display
of a religious symbol in a particular context entails an element of
coercion or indoctrination that constitutes a violation of the freedom of
thought, conscience or religion guaranteed by article 9 ECHR. With
particular reference to the Lautsi case, I do not think that the Italian law
that imposes the presence of the crucifix in all public schools of the
country is a good idea – it would be more appropriate to take such a
decision at the local level – but, again, the role of the courts is not to
validate the appropriateness of such a political solution but only to
ascertain if the static presence of a small crucifix on the wall of a
classroom amounts to coercion or indoctrination. And the Grand
Chamber of the ECtHR, rightly, concluded that it did not.
It has been often said, and it is true, that the realm of education is
particularly sensitive with regard to the presence of religious symbols
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– institutional and personal – and other external expressions of religion,
for it involves the transmission of values to young generations, the right
of parents to decide the religious and moral orientation of their
children’s education, and the state’s obligation to abstain from
indoctrination against the parents’ wishes, out of respect for the
freedom of choice in matters of religion or belief (forum internum). In
essence, two basic approaches are possible in this matter. One is based
on an exclusive notion of state neutrality, which leads to the prohibition
of religious symbols in public schools with the aim of eliminating the
visibility of religion; an extreme conception of this kind is followed by
France, whose law excludes even noticeable personal garments that
reveal the students’ religion.56 The other is based on an inclusive notion
of neutrality, and allows for a variety of symbols, institutional and
personal, that can coexist and are part of the ordinary ‘landscape’ of the
public school.57
56 Loi n.º  2004-228, du 15 mars 2004, encadrant, en application du principe de
laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse
dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics. This law and its conception of state
neutrality have been recently ratified by the Charte de la laïcité à l'École,
produced by the French Ministry of Education (circulaire n∫ 2013-144 du 6-9-
2013); text available in: http://www.education.gouv.fr/pid25535/bulletin_
officiel.html?cid_bo=73659 (accessed 26 October 2013). For a critical
comment on the 2004 French law, see A. Garay, Secularism, Schools and
Religious Affiliation: For a Demanding Account of Law no. 2004-228 of March
15, 2004, in ‘Islam and Political-Cultural Europe’ (ed. by W.C. Durham, D.M.
Kirkham and T. Lindholm), Ashgate, Aldershot, 2012, pp. 117-145. In the
broader context of relations between state and religion in France, see B.
Chelini-Pont & T.J. Gunn, Dieu en France et aux Etat-Unis. Quand les mythes
font la loi, Berg, Paris, 2005. In Spain, see S. Cañamares Arribas, Libertad
religiosa, simbología y laicidad del Estado, Aranzadi, Pamplona, 2005, pp. 70
et seq.; A. Gonz· lez-Varas Ibáñez, Confessioni religiose, diritto e scuola
pubblica in Italia. Insegnamento, culto e simbologia religiosa nelle scuole
pubbliche, CLUEB, Bologna, 2005, pp. 229 et seq.; M.J. Ciáurriz, Laicidad y
ley sobre los símbolos religiosos en Francia, in ‘El pañuelo isl· mico en
Europa’, cit. en nota 51, pp. 91 et seq. 
57 This is the line that seems to be suggested by the recent EU Guidelines on the
promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, approved by the
Council of the European Union on 24 June 2013 (see especially ßß 34, 37 &
46). Text available in http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/EN/ foraff/137585.pdf (accessed 26 October 2013).
L&Wjournal122013:L&Wjournal1009  24/02/2014  11:57  Page 50
INSTITUTIONAL RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS 51
Although both approaches are legitimate from the perspective of the
ECHR, and in general from the perspective of international standards
on religious freedom, I certainly prefer the one based on an inclusive
concept of neutrality. Among other things, because it is more realistic
than creating an artificial school atmosphere characterized by the
absence of religion. I find no reason to require, in a country enjoying
religious peace, that there should be no religious symbols visible either
in classrooms or in the students’ or teachers’ clothes. Instead, it is
preferable to make it possible for students to see in their own school an
evidence of the religious pluralism existing in society. Allowing
spontaneous expressions of religious pluralism seems to be more
consistent with a neutral attitude of the state, and probably also more
educative for students than imposing the fictitious absence of religion.
Unless there is a specific risk to the public order or the social peace, or
unless the presence of religious symbols actually puts pressure on
people disagreeing with them, a strict prohibition of external signs of
religion – institutional or personal, Christian or of other religions – is
not necessary either to preserve state neutrality or to protect the
freedom of choice of members of the school community in belief
matters. 
Indeed, such a prohibition could transmit a wrong subliminal message
to young generations. If the school is supposed to be the realm of
reason, culture and values, i.e., the domain of civilization, excluding
religion from school could be easily understood as implying that
religion does not belong in school (while other non-religious beliefs
do). I can hardly see it as a manifestation of neutrality.
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